From: Shea, James
Sent: Wednesday, March 23, 2011 5:57 PM
To: RST01 Hoc; RST07 Hoc; RST05 Hoc
Cc: Brown, Michael; Norton, Charles; Brown, Eva; Ruland, William; Nelson, Robert; Plasse, Richard; Brittner, Donald; James Shea; Reckley, William; Holahan, Gary
Subject: What We would Do (The US BWR Operating Community)
As former Operators / STA / SRO, CRO at Oyster Creek NGS and Emergency Director at JAF, we could not help but watch in horror as our sister plants were destroyed following the earthquake and tsunami. Knowing the challenges the operators faced I and my BWR colleagues at the NRC are
thinking how we would have responded to these incredible beyond design basis events. Also we should start formulating a basis of lessons learned that could be shared with the US BWR fleet as well as all nuclear plants to potentially advise our licensees and all U.S. stakeholders on these events
and how the U.S. Fleet would or could cope in this situation.
As listed in our talking points developed by the RST team last week some of the engineered systems that the US plants have available may have prevented this event.
1) Multiple AC power supplies available from On-Site and Off-Site including AC sources required by SBO rule 50.63. EDGs with protected fuel supply required by Technical Specifications. Gravity feed from main fuel oil tank with double pipe protection and leak detection capability.
2) Diesel Driven Fire-Pumps that could be lined up to Core Spray System (probably taken out in tsunami). However, if in the US a plant needed to replace the Diesel Driven Fire Pumps our guess is that they could have been sent to a stricken site within a 24 hr time frame.
3) Hardened Vent to vent containment outside the Reactor Building, to prevent catastrophic explosion inside the reactor building which affects the structural viability of the spent fuel pools.
4) EOPs / SAMGs to ensure that the containment(s) Primary and Secondary is protected.
5) B5b pumps and equipment readily available from on-site or off-site nuclear plants.