Summary of Committee Investigation on the Fukushima Daiichi and Daini Accidents

Author: No Comments Share:

Executive Summary of the Interim Report

Investigation Committee on the Accidents at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company

December 26, 2011

Table of contents

1. Introduction
2. Outline of the Accidents
3. Issues of responses by government organizations to the Accidents

(1) Issues of the local nuclear emergency response headquarters
(2) Issues of the nuclear emergency response headquarters
(3) Remaining issues

4. Issues of responses to the Accidents at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

(1) Misjudgment of operational situation of IC at Unit 1
(2) Poor handling of alternative water injections at Unit 3
(3) Relation with explosions in the Units 1 and 3 reactor buildings

5. Issues relating to the measures for preventing the expansion of damage

(1) Issues relating to the initial radiation monitoring
(2) Issues relating to the utilization of SPEEDI
(3) Issues relating to the decision-making of evacuation of residents and confusion at localities
(4) Issues relating to providing information to the nation and international society
(5) Review of other measures for preventing the expansion of damage

6. Inappropriate precautionary measures against tsunamis and severe accidents

(1) Inappropriate measures against tsunami and severe accident
(2) Issues relating to measures by TEPCO against natural disasters

7. Why were the measures against tsunami and severe accident insufficient?
8. Recommendations on the new nuclear safety regulatory body
9. Preliminary conclusions
10. Closing

The Investigation Committee on the Accidents at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations (“the Investigation Committee”) of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)
was established by the Cabinet decision on May 24, 2011.

Its objectives are: to conduct investigation and evaluation for finding out the causes of Accidents at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS) and Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station (Fukushima Dai-ni NPS) of TEPCO as well as the causes of accident damage; and to make policy recommendations for limiting the expansion of damage and preventing reoccurrence of similar accident.

The Investigation Committee has conducted its investigation and evaluation since its first meeting on June 7, 2011. Its activities included: site visits to the Fukushima
Dai-ichi and Dai-ni NPSs, as well as to other facilities; hearing of heads of local governments around the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS; and hearing of people concerned
through interviews mainly by the Secretariat. As of December 16, 2011, the number of interviewees reached 456.

The investigation and evaluation by the Investigation Committee are still ongoing and the Interim Report does not cover every item that the Committee aims at
investigating and evaluating. Fact-finding of even some of those items discussed in the Interim Report are not yet completed.

The Investigation Committee continues to conduct its investigation and evaluation and will issue its Final Report in the summer of 2012.

This brief executive summary covers mainly considerations and evaluation of the issues in Chapter VII of the Interim Report, with brief reference to Chapters I to VI.

The Investigation Committee recommendations are printed in bold.

Executive Summary of the Accidents at Fukushima Daiichi

[toggle_simple title=”Related articles” width=”600″]


Previous Article

March 17th, 2011 – MACCS calculations capable of 8,000 miles – Usually run to 1,000 miles

Next Article

Citizens in Shimada Japan Unite Against Plan to Take Radioactive Rubble